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Capital Adequacy Regulation
Aysa Siddika and Razali Haron
Abstract
This chapter aims to provide a concise overview of the capital adequacy 
regulation, importance of the regulation, and evolution of the capital adequacy 
regulation. Bank capital executes the significant role of preventing the bank from 
failure and acts as a buffer against possible losses. Capital adequacy is the least 
amount of capital a bank has to preserve to execute the business, take advantage 
of profitable growth opportunities, absorb losses, and sustain the customers’ con-
fidence on it. Several bank crises and bank defaults motivate the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision to provide a comprehensive guideline in managing bank 
capital. The capital adequacy regulation is an international standard to safeguard 
the banks through setting a risk-sensitive minimum capital requirement. The 
regulatory authority sets the regulatory capital, and the operating banks are 
required to maintain the adequate level of capital.
Keywords: capital adequacy regulation, Basel Accord, Basel Committee, 
regulatory capital, risk-weighted asset
1. Introduction
History of several bank failures evidences how the excessive risk taking can 
affect the whole economy as well as the global financial scenario. Since bank deals 
with different kinds of risks, the regulators strive to minimize this risk exposure 
through different regulations. The key regulations aiming to minimize the risk 
and bank failure is the capital adequacy regulation. The principle of the capital 
adequacy regulation is based on the fact that the minimum capital should be high 
enough to absorb the potential losses. While capital acts as a buffer for the bank, in 
the distressed period, the higher the buffer, the lower the risk of default. Therefore, 
the importance of maintenance of adequate level of capital is never overestimated. 
This chapter will present a brief history of capital adequacy regulation and the 
evolution of the regulation over time.
2. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
Bank for International Settlement (BIS), the oldest international financial 
organization, was founded in 1930. Its members are central banks or the regulatory 
authorities of 60 countries. The committee aims to serve as a regulatory authority 
for monetary and financial stability and foster international cooperation.
West Germany’s Herstatt Bank closed its operation on June 26, 1974, due to 
excessive foreign exchange risk that posed counterparty risk in international 
settlement with the banks in New York. Subsequently, at the end of 1974 due to this 
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cross-jurisdiction implication, BIS formed “Committee on Banking Regulations 
and Supervisory Practices” also known as Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(BCBS) headquartered in Basel. Since the inception, the committee has established 
a series of banking standards to promote monetary and financial stability. Though 
at the beginning, the group’s members were the governor of Central banks of G10 
countries, at present, it has 45 institutions from 28 jurisdictions.
BCBS provides assistance to the central banks through regular cooperation to 
improve the quality of supervision in the banking industry. The committee sets reg-
ulations for the central banks. In addition, it acts consistently to enhance the finan-
cial stability and level playing field to avoid competitiveness conflicts globally. The 
member countries implement its prudential regulations and report to the committee 
periodically. BCBS decisions are expected to be followed by the member countries 
toward sound practice and standard guidelines in the financial industry [1].
The Committee’s members are Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, 
European Union, France, Germany, Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, 
Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South 
Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
BCBS performs as a forum for regular cooperation on banking standard, regulation, and 
supervision issues between the member countries. It provides comprehensive guidelines 
for managing bank capital to safeguard against operational and financial risk in an 
international standard. Toward this standardization in banking operation and supervi-
sion, the committee has published a number of landmark guidelines on capital adequacy 
known as Basel I, Basel II, and Basel III.
This guideline advises holding a minimum amount of capital on the risk-
weighted assets of the bank. This regulation is called the capital adequacy regula-
tion (CAR) or minimum capital requirement (MCR).
2.1 Regulatory capital and economic capital
Banks as public confidence institution are strictly guided by regulations 
and supervision by the regulatory authority. Since risk is an integral part of any 
financial institution, in the process of providing different services to the economy 
banks come across different types of risk in their operation. As a result, risk is the 
subject of all regulation bases [2]. Regulators and risk managers define risk as an 
uncertainty that has adverse effect on the positive outcome of the bank like banks 
return, asset, or goodwill. Hence, the regulations intend to enhance the resilience of 
the bank in the stressed situations to protect the interest of the depositors and other 
associated counterparts of the bank.
In discussion of bank capital, the most widely used terms that come together are 
regulatory capital and economic capital. Regulatory capital as its name implies is 
the minimum level of capital required by the regulatory authority. Principally, the 
regulatory capital should be derived from the maximization of the social welfare 
function that takes into account the cost and benefit of the capital regulation [3]. 
Economic capital is the level of capital chosen by the shareholder of the bank. It 
relates with a desired rating required to safeguard the bank’s losses at a certain 
confidence level. So, if the bank’s loss during a period is higher than the initial level 
of capital, it will be in default. Therefore, the shareholder trades off between the 
costs of raise or increase of the equity against the benefit of reducing the banks 
probability of default. Mainly, cost of capital determines the relative position of 
the economic and regulatory capital. When the cost of capital is low, the economic 
capital is higher than the level of regulatory capital [3].
While discussing the economic capital and regulatory capital levels, the actual 
level of capital or actual capital arises. Actual capital is higher than the regulatory 
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level chosen by the shareholder taking into consideration different regulatory 
requirements. Threat of closing the undercapitalized bank or avoidance of penalty 
insists the bank management and shareholders to keep the actual capital level above 
the minimum requirement.
In this chapter, we will discuss the regulatory capital or the minimum capital 
requirement (MCR) of the bank.
2.2 Basel I
In 1998, when the world economy faced the economic recession, the Latin 
American countries could not sustain their debts due to higher interest rates of 
loans and shorten repayment period [1]. These sovereign defaults possess criti-
cal situation for the international banks by eroding the capital buffer and global 
financial stability. The concern for global financial stability encouraged the BCBS 
committee to set up an international standard for risk measurement. The committee 
released a capital measurement system referred to as the “Basel Capital Accord” in 
July 1988 [4]. The principal of this measurement was to weigh the on-balance sheet 
and off-balance sheet asset according to the risk they possess. The accord required 
banks to hold at least 8% of risk-weighted assets (RWA) as capital; 50% of which 
must be Tier 1 or core capital.
Initially Basel Accord I focused to the credit risk of the bank measured by the 
Cookie ratio. However, being criticized for exaggerating on the credit risk in 1996, 
an amendment was issued through incorporating the market risk to address banks’ 
exposure in foreign exchange risk, securities trade, equities, commodities, and 
options [4]. This amendment permitted the bank to use internal model to measure 
the market risk and associated capital against this risk.
The first Basel Accord, i.e., Basel I was introduced among the member coun-
tries of G-10 which includes Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the 
Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
The accord was designed to implement among all of the internationally active banks 
across countries to make a level playing field, i.e., to avoid competitiveness conflicts 
globally. For large and complex institutions, the regulation becomes less significant. 
Finally, a more risk-sensitive and comprehensive capital structure guideline—Basel 
II—was developed.
2.3 Basel II
As a response to Enron scandal and innovation of financial derivatives after the 
execution of Basel Accord I, a new regulatory framework was imperative to introduce.
A more sensitive new capital requirement known as Basel II was initiated shortly 
in 2004 to accommodate the highly complex on- and off-balance sheet items, 
promote more risk sensitive capital requirement through banks own assessment, 
and provide greater transparency. The purpose of the Basel II accord was to address 
the risk areas that were not covered by Basel I, to measure the capital requirement 
above the minimum level.
The Basel II accord released in 2004 was developed on three pillars, which are as 
follows:
i. Pillar I or minimum capital requirement (MCR)
ii. Pillar II or supervisory review process (SRP)
iii. Pillar III or market discipline (MD)
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2.3.1 Pillar I or minimum capital requirement (MCR)
Pillar I or MCR states that banks are required to maintain regulatory capital 
that is 8% of risk-weighted assets (RWA). The RWA refer to the total assets of 
the bank that are risk-adjusted or weighted against credit risk, market risk, and 
operational risk according to the risk grade. Bank assets consist of cash, invest-
ment in securities, loans to governments, and businesses individuals that bear 
different risk characteristics. Therefore, risk weight is assigned to this asset 
group to indicate the level of riskiness in each asset group. To calculate the capital 
requirement, it takes into account both the on-balance sheet and off-balance sheet 
items of the bank.
Eligible regulatory capital is constituent of core capital or Tier 1 capital and 
supplementary capital or Tier 2 capital. Pillar I states the maintenance of regula-
tory capital on these two types. Core capital is the equity capital of the bank, 
retained earnings, and other reserves. For supervisory purposes, the committee 
determined to present the capital of the bank in two groups Tier 1 and Tier 2 where 
Tier 1 or the core capital should not be less than 50% of the total capital base of the 
bank that consists of common equity and approved reserves from the retained earn-
ings. Other elements of the capital will have to be grouped in Tier 2 that is limited to 
100% of the core capital or Tier 1 capital. Tier 2 includes the following:
• Undisclosed reserve or unpublished reserves
• Revaluation reserve of certain assets
• General provision/general loan-loss reserves
• Hybrid debt capital instrument
• Subordinated term debt
Short-term subordinated debt covering market risk or Tier 3 capital. Even 
though the eligible regulatory capital consists of core capital and supplementary 
capital, to cover the market risk, bank at its discretion can build Tier 3 capital that 
consists of short-term subordinated debt. This Tier 3 capital base can be built to 
support solely the market risk and cannot be higher than 250% of the core capital or 
Tier 1 capital.
The items to be deducted from the capital base are goodwill (deduction from 
Tier 1 capital), increase in equity due to securitization exposure, and investment in 
subsidiaries performing in the banking and financial sector that is not included in 
the national system.
Minimum capital requirement (MCR) is calculated for credit risk, market risk, 
and operational risk. BCBS advises that the minimum capital requirement under 
Basel II must be 8%, which will be calculated as follows:
  CAR =  Tier 1 + Tier 2 − Deductions + Tier3  ___________________________________    
Cr risk RWA + Oper risk RWA + Mkt risk RWA
 ≥ 8% (1)
where CAR is the capital adequacy ratio, Tier 1 is the Tier 1 capital, Tier 2 is 
the Tier 2 capital, Tier 3 is the Tier 3 capital, Cr risk RWA is the risk-weighted asset 
for credit risk, Oper risk RWA is the risk-weighted asset for operational risk, and 
Mkt risk RWA is the risk-weighted asset for market risk.
The following sections present a brief discussion on calculation of capital 
requirements for these risk areas, i.e., credit risk, operational risk, and market risk.
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2.3.1.1 Credit risk
Risk-weighted asset for credit risk is calculated for credit RWA for exposure in 
banking book except the counterparty credit risk arising from equity investment, 
securitization exposure, and trading book instruments. Bank can choose either 
standardized approach (SA) or internal ratings-based approach (IRBA) to calcu-
late their capital requirement against credit risk. In standard approach the risk is 
measured by the support of external rating or credit assessments whereas internal 
rating based approach is conducted by banks internal rating system and subject to 
the approval of the supervisors [5].
In case of standardized approach, claims against different counterparties are risk 
weighted against their rating. This credit rating is assessed by external credit rating 
institutions. In case of absence of any credit rating, the banks are advised to follow 
the instruction by the regulatory authorities. National regulatory or supervisory 
authorities permit the eligibility of the external credit assessment institution upon 
fulfillment of certain conditions. The credit rating agency must fulfill six criteria: 
objectivity, independence, international access/transparency, disclosure, resource, 
and credibility.
BCBS advises risk weight for claims on sovereigns, non-central government 
public sector entities, multilateral development banks, banks, securities firms, 
corporates, included in the regulatory retail portfolios, secured by residential 
property, commercial real estate, past due loans, and off-balance sheet items. A 
higher credit score signifies lower risk weight in calculating the risk-weighted asset 
of the bank. In standardized approach, bank calculates the total risk-weighted asset 
of the bank taking into consideration the whole credit portfolio. Along with the 
regular claims, the unsecured loans that are past due for more than 90 days are also 
risk weighted. This unsecured portion of the loan is risk weighted after the net of 
specific provision.
In standardized approach, the off-balance sheet items are converted into credit 
exposure equivalents through the use of credit conversion factors (CCF). The original 
maturity time determines the CCF of different commitments in the off-balance 
sheet items.
Internal ratings-based approach (IRB) as its name implies relies on own estimates 
of risk measurement in determining the capital requirement against credit risk, 
which are subject to fulfillment of certain conditions as well as disclosure require-
ments by the regulatory authorities. In IRB, the risk management team identifies 
the probability of default (PD), loss given default (LGD), the exposure at default 
(EAD), and effective maturity (M). Through these risk components, banks measure 
the unexpected loss (UL) and expected loss (EL). The capital requirements are 
calculated on the basis of unexpected loss. Expected losses are treated separately [5].
2.3.1.2 Operational risk
BCBS defines operational risk as “the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or 
failed internal processes, people, and systems or from external events.” It includes the 
legal risk and excludes strategic and reputational risk. The committee advises three 
measurement approaches to calculate the capital charge against the operational risk of 
the bank. The approaches are (i) the basic indicator approach (BIA), (ii) standardized 
approach (SA), and (iii) advanced measurement approach (AMA).
Banks are encouraged to follow the sequential order of the measurement 
approaches. The level of sophisticated risk measurement system and practice would 
decide to follow the later approaches, i.e., standardized approach and advanced 
measurement approach. Internationally active banks with significant risk exposure 
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in the operational areas are permitted to follow the standardized or advanced 
measurement approach.
In basic indicator approach, the capital charge for operational risk is equal to the 
15% of average positive annual gross income of the bank. Gross income is the total 
of net interest income and net non-interest income. It does not include any realized 
profit or loss from the sale of securities and any income derived from insurance. The 
calculation of capital charge in basic indicator approach is as follows:
  K BIA =  [Σ ( GI 1…n × 𝛂) ] / n (2)
Here KBIA is the capital charge in basic indicator approach; GI is the gross 
income, which was positive, over the previous 3 years; n is the number of previous 3 
years for which gross income is positive; and α is 15% required capital level against 
the operational risk.
In standardized approach, a bank’s activities are divided into eight sectors: cor-
porate finance, trading and sales, retail banking, commercial banking, payment and 
settlement, agency services, asset management, and retail brokerage. In standard-
ized approach, for every sector separate gross income is calculated separately. To 
measure the capital charge, this sectoral gross income is multiplied by denoted beta 
(a factor). Beta is a proxy variable that denotes relationship between the operational 
risk (of loss) for the particular business sector and aggregate level of gross income 
for that business sector [5]. Unlike basic indicator approach, standardized approach 
measures capital charge for each business line separately.
In SA, capital charge is calculated by taking the 3 years average of simple sum-
mation of the regulatory capital charge for each of the business sectors. Any nega-
tive capital charge due to negative gross income for any business sector may offset 
the positive capital charge in other business sector without limit. If the aggregate 
capital charge across all business lines in a certain time period is negative, then the 
numerator will be considered as zero. BCBS expressed the equation as follows:
  K SA =  { Σ Years 1–3 max  [Σ ( GI 1–8 X  β 1–8 ) , 0] } / 3 (3)
where KSA is the capital charge under the standardized approach; GI1–8 is 
the annual gross income in a given year, for each of the eight business sectors; and 
β1–8 is a fixed percentage, set by the BCBS, the level of required capital to the level of 
the gross income for each of the eight business sectors.
Table 1 presents the value of β for each business sector as prescribed by BCBS 
[5] as follows.
Sl. no. Business sector Value of β (%)
1 Corporate finance 18
2 Trading and sales 18
3 Retail banking 12
4 Commercial banking 15
5 Payment and settlement 18
6 Agency services 15
7 Asset management 12
8 Retail brokerage 12
Table 1. 
Value of β for different business sectors.
7Capital Adequacy Regulation
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.92178
In advanced measurement approach, banks use some qualitative and quantita-
tive criteria to calculate the risk exposure and capital charge by their own. This 
approach requires complex modeling and is subject to the approval of the supervi-
sory authority.
2.3.1.3 Market risk
BCBC defines market risk as “the risk of losses in on- and off-balance sheet posi-
tions arising from movements in market prices.” Sources of market risk are interest 
rate risk, foreign exchange risk, and commodities risk [5]. Interest risk arises from 
the loss due to movement of interest rate. Foreign exchange risk arises from changes 
in banks’ assets and liability due to the fluctuation of foreign exchange rate. In the 
case of cross-border investments, when banks invest in different currencies risk 
arises due to adverse changes in the exchange rate. Similarly, commodity risk arises 
from the uncertain future market price changes in commodity prices.
Market risk is measured using the standardized measurement method and value 
at risk (VaR) or internal model approach. The choice of method is subject to the 
permission of the regulatory authorities. In standardized measurement method, 
four risks are addressed which are interest rate, equity position, foreign exchange, 
and commodities risk. The practice of internal model approach is subject to compli-
ance of certain conditions and approval of the supervisory authorities.
Therefore, bank’s total minimum capital requirement will be the summation of 
the capital requirement against the credit risk, capital charge for operational risk, 
and capital charge for market risk of the bank.
2.3.2 Pillar II or supervisory review process (SRP)
Pillar II or supervisory review process intends to assure that the bank has 
sufficient capital to support different risks arising in the business operation as 
well as encourage developing and practicing better risk management technique. 
SRP concedes the bank management to set capital target through developing an 
Internal Capital Assessment Process (ICAAP) that commensurate with banks own 
risk profile [5]. It also ensures that the bank management bears the responsibility 
to maintain the adequate level of capital beyond the minimum level to support 
its risk. The committee identifies the appropriate relationship between the risk 
and amount of capital and the effectiveness of bank’s internal control and risk 
management process. The role of supervisory authority is to evaluate how the 
operating banks are assessing their risk and capital requirement and intervene if 
necessary. SRP intends to intervene the bank regulators to prevent capital shortfall 
from the minimum level in the early stage and to take rapid corrective action [5]. 
The SRP takes into account other risk factors that are not considered in Pillar 
I (i.e., liquidity risk and interest risk). The regulatory authority evaluates the 
bank’s assessment of capital, ability to monitor, and be compliant with the capital 
regulations.
2.3.3 Pillar III or market discipline
Pillar III promotes market discipline through a set of qualitative and quantitative 
disclosure requirements that allow the market participants to understand the scope 
of application, capital position, risk exposure, and assessment of the banks. It is 
complement to Pillars I and II. Therefore, the disclosure allows a bank to present its 
risk position that is based on a common and consistent framework to the regulatory 
authority as well as public for comparison and credibility.
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Bank supervisors having their power to disclose requirements to the operating 
banks contribute to safe and sound banking practices. Banks will have a formal 
disclosure policy approved by the board of directors, which exhibits the items to 
be disclosed, frequency, and internal control over the process. These capital and 
risk disclosure requirements do not conflict with and minimize the scope of the 
accounting requirements.
2.4 Basel III
Global economy suffers severe financial distress during 2007–2008. Excess 
liquidity in the banking sector resulting in too much weak credit or loans to 
subprime borrowers is at the top of the list behind the crisis of 2007–2008. Other 
reasons that triggered the global crisis are excessive risk taken by the financial 
firms, excess leverage, lack of adequate quality capital, inadequate liquidity buf-
fer, and excess dependence on the credit rating agency [6]. The crisis revealed the 
lapses in the regulatory framework, market transparency, and supervision quality 
[7]. The crisis of 2007–2008 exposed the shortcomings of Basel II in managing the 
systematic risk and revealed the moral hazard problem linked with the systemati-
cally important banks.
In response to the crisis, BCBS addressing the weaknesses proposed revised 
capital framework that enforces raising higher quality of capital. It suggests build-
ing more common equity to improve loss absorption capacity and maintaining two 
liquidity standards and leverage ratio. The purpose of the regulation is to increase 
the level and quality of capital, enhance risk capture, constrain bank leverage, 
improve bank liquidity, and limit pro-cyclicality. In 2017, the committee reforms 
Basel III 2010 that seeks the credibility in risk calculation and improvement in 
comparison on the capital position of the bank [8].
The minimum amount of common equity to be maintained is increased from 
2 to 4.5% and capital conservation buffer of 2.5% of the risk-weighted assets of 
the bank. In addition, the regulatory authority can enforce additional capital buf-
fer during the period of excess credit growth. For systemically important banks, 
additional loss absorbency capacity can be introduced [7]. In 2017 reform, the 
committee has brought some changes in calculating credit risk through detailed 
risk weighing rather than flat risk weight for loans against residential and com-
mercial real estate. In addition, banks are advised to perform due diligence in 
case of relying on external credit ratings.
To make the banking industry more stable, building capital alone is not suf-
ficient. Therefore, to protect against buildup of excessive balance sheet leverage, 
Basel III introduced non-risk-based leverage ratio. This non-risk-based leverage 
ratio is Tier 1 capital to average total restated balance sheet assets over the quarter. 
The leverage ratio should be minimum 3%.
Moreover, for better resilience, (a) liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) for short-
term disruption and (b) net stable funding ratio (NSFR) for long-term liquidity 
mismatch in the balance sheet are introduced. LCR is a standard for a minimum 
level of liquidity where the institution can generate enough cash outflow from the 
high-quality liquid assets in any short-term distress situation. The LCR standard is 
measured by the ratio of stock of high liquid assets to total net cash outflows over 
the next 30 calendar days. However, NSFR measures the sustainable funding ratio 
relating to the assets and off-balance sheet activities [9]. NSFR is the ratio of the 
available amount of stable funding to the required amount of stable funding, which 
should be greater than 100%. It suggests the banks to rely on long-term liabilities 
over short-term liabilities and small and retail liabilities over wholesome liabilities 
in case of short-term maturity (less than 1 year) for better resilience.
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The crisis also revealed that the existing regulation has not appropriately covered 
major on- and off-balance sheet items, trading book, and derivative-related risk 
exposure. BCBS advises a revised framework to address the trading book exposure 
under Basel III that increases the capital charges around three to four times of previ-
ous level. Basel III upholds the counterparty credit risk management and collateral 
risk management and addresses the pro-cyclicality effect and credit valuation 
adjustment risk to reduce the reliance on external credit rating agencies. Table 2 
presents the present capital ratio and liquidity ratio advised by the committee [10].
2.4.1 Capital conservation buffer and countercyclical buffer
The case of Lehman Brothers and AIG call attention to how a single firm can 
boost up shock in the financial market as well as in the global economy. The finan-
cial crisis of 2007–2008 has revealed that microprudential guideline alone is not 
sufficient to address the systematic risk. Macroprudential regulation that takes into 
account the risk arising from interconnectedness of the financial institutions is 
important to respond to the systematic risk and financial stability in the economy.
Therefore, the macroprudential guidelines impose additional capital require-
ment for systematically important banks to reduce their default probability. 
BCBS advises building common equity of 2.5% of risk-weighted asset as capital 
conservation buffer so that in times of distress, this buffer can be scaled down to 
absorb losses. BCBS also advises the regulatory authorities to raise an additional 
countercyclical capital buffer of 2.5% to respond with excessive credit growth that 
may induce systematic risk in the financial sector. Banks incur a huge loss during 
downturn followed by a long excessive aggregate credit growth. After the asset 
price bubbles loans go unpaid, prices go down, banks loan decrease, and level of 
defaults even increases more [11]. To prevent this systematic risk, banks are advised 
to build additional capital up to 2.5% during the credit growth time that ensures 
the sufficient level of capital during the distress periods. It ensures that during the 
downturn, the banking institution has enough cushions to absorb the additional 
loss and provisioning. It also intends to support the financial stability by building 
countercyclical capital buffer during boom period through increasing to the cost of 
credit which reduces the demand for it [12].
3. Islamic banking and capital regulation
BCBS provides capital standard for conventional banks but Islamic banks 
are also under the same jurisdiction toward a safe and sound banking system. 
Islamic banks differ from the conventional banks in their operation due to 
Particulars Minimum % of RWA
Common equity 4.5
Capital conservation buffer 2.5
Tier 1 capital 6
Total capital 8
Liquidity coverage ratio ≥100
Net stable funding ratio ≥100
Table 2. 
Minimum capital requirement ratio.
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unique items in the liability side of the balance sheet, risk sharing with the 
depositor and investor, absence of interest, and so on. Moreover, Islamic banks 
cannot access some credit derivatives to mitigate risk like conventional banks 
because of governing by the Shariah Principle. Wide range of financing mode 
also poses Islamic banking to face different kinds of risk. Since the operation of 
Islamic banking differs from the conventional banking, the determination of 
capital requirements also differs [13]. Studies find BCBS capital regulation does 
not address the risk of Islamic bank and lacks the goal to minimize the level of 
risk faced by the Islamic banks. Furthermore, it contributes to increase the risk 
of Islamic banks [14].
The Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) is an international organization 
that provides prudential guidelines and standards for the Islamic banks, insurance 
(takaful), and capital markets to enhance the stability of the Islamic financial 
industry. IFSB provides the standards aligning with the global regulatory standards 
in calculating capital requirements, thereby making disclosure toward transparency 
and market discipline [12]. However, because of asset-based financing, profit-loss 
sharing, profit bearing, or loss sharing principle, the capital determination is dif-
ferent from the conventional banking institution. Like the BCBS, IFSB also advises 
countercyclical capital buffer to the Islamic banks to reduce the systematic risk 
during the period of excessive credit growth.
4. Empirical studies on capital regulation and bank risk
The relationship between bank capital level and risk management is the 
most studied issue after the capital regulation regime. The empirical evidence 
provides useful insights about the factors affecting the risk undertaking of the 
banks. However, the studies focusing on the relationship between capital, risk 
management, and performance found contrasting results. Several studies found, 
in effect, that capital regulation stimulates the banks to take excessive risk 
through allowing the banks to increase riskier investment with the increase of 
bank capital [6]. Regulatory restriction, lower rate of return, riskier portfolio, 
and deposit insurance are the major causes identified behind the positive associa-
tion between risk and capital regulations [15, 16]. Building capital raises cost of 
capital, decreases expected profit and rate of return, and induces the bank to 
invest in riskier sector that is more riskier in the long run [16]. Conversely, strict 
regulation, income diversity, and bank size are the factors identified behind the 
negative relationship between capital regulation and bank risk [17–20]. However, 
studies also find that capital regulation has different impact on conventional and 
Islamic banks.
5. Conclusion
Bank regulations and supervisions are to make the financial system more 
resilient that facilitate the stakeholders, creditors, depositors, and different 
counterparties. It prevents banks to take excessive risk. Therefore, to increase the 
financial stability around the world, BCBS a committee of BIS provides prudential 
guidelines for the banks and other financial institutions. The committee has advised 
three capital accords: Basel I, Basel II, and Basel III. Basel III is addressed to mitigate 
the regulatory lapses and systematic risk faced by the banks during recent financial 
crisis of 2007–2008.
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